Entry screening for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or influenza: policy evaluation. by Pitman, RJ et al.
Pitman, RJ; Cooper, BS; Trotter, CL; Gay, NJ; Edmunds, WJ (2005)
Entry screening for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or in-
fluenza: policy evaluation. BMJ, 331 (7527). pp. 1242-3. ISSN
0959-535X DOI: 10.1136/bmj.38573.696100.3A
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/6808/
DOI: 10.1136/bmj.38573.696100.3A
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/
Commentary: Sleeping sickness—a growing problem?
Jean G Jannin
This Ugandan sleeping sickness research is timely.1 After
five years of intensified control, the human African
trypanosomiasis landscape has changed. Before 2000,
the sleeping sickness epidemic was spreading in Africa.
Approximately half a million people living in the poor-
est areas were expected to be infected by this killer
disease. Early detection of cases, before the parasites
start to destroy the central nervous system, is essential
for effective treatment. This is the only way to avoid
using existing potent drugs (melarsoprol) or drugs that
are very difficult to administer in remote areas
(eflornithine requires an infusion every six hours for 14
days). In 2000, the availability of drugs was threatened
and the treatment of patients challenged. The establish-
ment of a large programme based on ensuring access
for populations to health facilities, diagnosis, and
treatment was conceived. This led to a long term dona-
tion of drugs—pentamidine, melarsoprol, eflornithine
(Sanofi-Aventis), and suramin (Bayer)—with access to
financial support (from Sanofi-Aventis, France and Bel-
gium), which led to a drastic reduction in epidemics,
assisted in the training of technicians, and ensured an
efficient drug supply system, as well as promoting the
use of the most efficient diagnostic tools and mobilising
the international community.2 3 Considering the
achievements made in the area of control of sleeping
sickness, leading to a current reduction of new cases and
increase of surveillance activities, the International
Scientific Council for Trypanosomiasis Research and
Control (at its 28th conference in Addis Ababa in
September 2005) recommended that WHO “Launch an
elimination programme of sleeping sickness, to adapt
control strategies towards this goal and advocate
partners who have permanently provided support to
maintain their efforts and assistance.”
Elimination of sleeping sickness as a public health
problem through use of existing tools for diagnosis
and treatment can be considered achievable. However,
owing to the lack of safe oral drugs to treat both early
and late stages of the disease, the integration of control
activities in basic health system might be impossible
and may lead to a non-sustainable elimination as it has
been seen in the past.2
The key for the integrated management of the dis-
ease by local health facilities is the availability of very
simple cheap diagnostic tools and safe oral drugs to
treat both Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense and T b gambi-
ense. Finding new diagnostics and drugs will be the key
for an achievable and cost effective sustainable
elimination. But as a down side of success, entry into
the elimination stage might cause control of sleeping
sickness to be seen as less of a major public health
problem. A low priority is being given to the disease
and its research and development.3 The main
challenge today is to avoid creating a situation in which
the re-emergence of the disease might occur, after
huge efforts had been expended in achieving a
situation in which we are close to its elimination.
In this context, the Ugandan case is of great
interest,1 4 because the possible overlap of T b rhodesiense
and T b gambiense could provoke big difficulties for the
diagnosis and treatment of patients, taking into account
the fact that no easy way exists to identify the two strains
of parasites.5 It could also provoke a high burden
because the treatments are different.2 A close surveil-
lance of this phenomenon is a priority. In addition, as
cattle are the main reservoir of T b rhodesiense, this
should encourage authorities to treat cattle systemati-
cally to avoid new epidemics.4 This kind of large mass
chemotherapy for cattle will be advantageous if done in
partnership with the medical sector.
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Entry screening for severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) or influenza: policy evaluation
R J Pitman, B S Cooper, C L Trotter, N J Gay, W J Edmunds
The appearance of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) and recent outbreaks of avian influenza
have raised the question of how best to protect the
population of England and Wales from such
infections. Entry screening is at present of unknown
benefit.
We assess the possible benefit of entry screening
for SARS and pandemic influenza should an epidemic
occur.
Methods and results
Throughout this analysis, we assume that effective exit
screening is in place, that symptomatic patients will not
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be allowed to board flights, and that the value of entry
screening is to detect people who develop symptoms in
flight.
We estimated the incubation periods for influenza
and SARS from published sources.1 2 We used these dis-
tributions to estimate the proportion of individuals with
initially latent SARS and influenza infection developing
symptoms during a flight from any of the top 100
sources of international airline passengers to the United
Kingdom, given information on the mean duration of a
direct flight from these destinations (www.britishairways.
com/travel/schedules/public/en_gb). For influenza,
given an overall prevalence of individuals with latent
infection, we used existing transmission models2 to esti-
mate the proportion expected to have been infected
one, two, or more days previously, during the increasing
phase of the epidemic. We back calculated correspond-
ing proportions for SARS from the incidence of
infection in Hong Kong at the start of the epidemic.
For SARS, the probability of in-flight progression
rises slowly with the duration of the flight. During a six
hour transatlantic flight, an infected passenger would
have a 0-11% chance of progression, depending on the
time since infection. Between 1% and 21% of such
infected individuals arriving from East Asian cities (10
hour flight) would be expected to be detected.
Influenza has a much shorter incubation period than
SARS, so the probability of progression during the flight
is higher. A passenger infected two days before departure
would have a 50% chance of progression during a 10
hour flight. As most flights are of much shorter duration,
the mean predicted proportion of people infected with
influenza and progressing during the flight was less than
10%. The proportion of infected individuals detected is
highest from cities with the longest flight duration (table).
Screening passengers from the Far East and Australasia
therefore derives the most benefit. Even then, the
sensitivity for cities in these areas would still be low.
Comment
Entry screening is unlikely to be effective in preventing
the importation of either SARS or influenza. The incu-
bation period for SARS is too long to allow more than
a small proportion of infected individuals to progress
to symptomatic disease during a flight to the UK from
any destination. Removing a maximum of 9% of
infected individuals will have a negligible impact on
the course of any subsequent epidemic. The propor-
tion of individuals infected with influenza that is
potentially detectable by screening is larger but still
small, and most would be missed. The short period
between generations of cases of influenza means that it
would take little time for those missed by screening to
infect secondary cases, replacing those detected.
We have ignored the possibility of in-flight transmis-
sion. Such transmission has been documented for SARS
as well as influenza.3–5 However, because time would be
insufficient for new secondary cases to develop
symptoms and become detectable by screening, this
omission will tend to overestimate rather than underes-
timate the proportion of infected individuals detected by
entry screening. Adopting a policy of quarantining all
exposed passengers on the detection of a single case
could, however, substantially increase the benefit of
entry screening. However, this still leaves the principal
problem that the sensitivity of entry screening is low.
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What is already known on this topic
In the event of a new SARS or influenza epidemic, air travel would
represent the principal route of international spread
Airport entry screening has been advocated, but not formally evaluated
as a means of protecting populations from these infections
What this study adds
Entry screening is unlikely to be effective in preventing or delaying an
epidemic resulting from the importation of SARS or influenza
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Predicted percentage of initially asymptomatically infected
individuals (detectable cases) arriving in the United Kingdom
from the most common sources of international passengers,
who would be expected to develop symptoms en route
Mean % of individuals
symptomatic on arrival (range) No of
airports
No of seats
available/daySARS Influenza
Europe 1 (0-3) 4 (1-9) 35 86 001
Middle East 3 (2-4) 10 (7-12) 8 6986
Africa 4 (3-5) 12 (10-15) 4 3751
North America 4 (3-9) 13 (10-23) 13 28 918
East Asia 6 (4-9) 17 (12-23) 12 12 489
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